Introduction
The term quality, with respect to products, is broadening from a characteristic built into a system by the way it is manufactured to characteristics entirely inherent to the design process --reliability and maintainability. A product is designed to achieve a given function and its quality is the degree to which it meets the functional specifications. Product failure is departure from these specifications. Emphasis on the consumer serves as the catalyst to bring about methodologies for increasing the degree a system meets its specifications through statistics and engineering. With the steady increase in complexity of systems, stringency of operating conditions, and positive identification of system effectiveness requirements, more and more emphasis is being placed on preventative maintenance, analysis, speedy repair, and replacement parts (Babb, 1973 ). These represent a major portion of system operating costs especially when each minute out of service is going to result in considerable financial loss for any high revenue-earning industry.
Diagnosability, the measure of the ease of isolating the cause of a loss of functionality, can strongly influence product quality through reliability and maintainability.
Poor diagnosability can increase the cost of a product through increased maintenance down time which, in turn, decreases quality because a product, in general, cannot provide its intended function during this time (Clark, 1993) . Improving diagnosability not only eases the diagnosis process--minimizing the total time of diagnosis, but the total cost of diagnosis is decreased in proportion to the above factors as well as in relation to the decrease in unjustified removals (removal of a suspect component later found to be in working order) of each Line Replaceable Unit (LRU)/Least Replaceable Assembly (LRA).
The historical unjustifiable removal rates of major components that are mechanical in nature average up to fifty percent higher than their failure rates. These inequities demand diagnosability metrics and methodologies to increase the quality of any mechanical system of today. Previous studies (Clark, 1993 and Wong 1994 ) present general methodologies which provide insight into the diagnosability of systems and suggest areas for design improvement, but focus mainly in the abstract. Previous work fails to address the issue of cost analysis of current and modified designs in a tangible way.
The objective of this research is to produce methodologies for the evaluation of diagnosability, a subset of maintainability, in the design and redesign phase of a product.
A metric common to all mechanical systems enabling a prediction of the costs and, in turn, the quality of the product is developed. This metric can be used to accurately predict not only current, but modified system life cycle costs based on reliability and maintainability, or specifically, diagnosability. An analysis is presented of a real system that has experienced diagnosability problems and has iterated through redesign phases. The metric evaluated is Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (MTBUR) --a function of both system structure and LRU failure rates.
The Bleed Air Control System (BACS) on the Boeing 737-300,400,500 aircraft was chosen as the analysis testbed for several reasons. Previous work (Clark, 1993 and Wong, 1994) utilized the 747-400 BACS, a subsequent iteration of the 737 BACS, so analytical comparisons can be drawn. The 737 BACS has a complete Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) available which can be modeled through a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The system has a diagnosability problem evident in a large number of unjustifiable removals of LRUs. Also, the determining factor, cost, can be arrived at since a complete life cycle costing mechanism is in place for the system. The objective is to decrease cost by manipulating indication-LRU relationships without increasing complexity.
In the following section the BACS is described and modeled stating all analysis assumptions. Next, the method and metrics for prediction and design are derived using reliability mathematics for quantitative diagnosability analysis. The modeling equation arrived at is tested on the original design and, based on redesign for diagnosability potential, modifications are made to the system. The modifications range from dividing primary LRU functions differently to merely changing sensor types. The modified systems are then re-evaluated on the basis of diagnosability and ultimately cost. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the diagnosability analysis, recommendations are made for system changes, and direction for future research is laid out.
Description and Modeling of the Boeing 737-300 Bleed Air Control

System
This section introduces the bleed air control system (BACS) including major LRUs and their indications. The scope of the analysis and all assumptions are explicitly stated for the system. Modeling of the system is accomplished with the use of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) by Airesearch and maintenance manuals provided by the Boeing Company. Failure combinations are incorporated in similar fashion to previous research (Clark, 1993) for ease of comparison analysis and application of system metrics. Though the 737-300 is singled out in this research, all analyses and recommendations can be extended to the 400 and 500 models since they are exactly the same.
Description of the Bleed Air Control System (BACS)
The BACS consists of two identical sets (one per engine) of valves, controls, ducts, and a heat exchanger mounted in the engine nacelle area as shown in figures 1 and 2. 
Scope and Assumptions of BACS Analysis
The valves, controls, ducts, and systems making up the BACS and described in the As opposed to previous research, this analysis incorporates all operating conditions of the aircraft at once since the information from all engine output conditions is realistically available to maintenance personnel. To move beyond the trivial, proper electrical power is assumed to be available to the system, a failure that has no indication associated with it is not considered, and an indicator failure is not considered since the flight crew can establish its validity. Failure of circuit protection is not considered. Valve port leakage and external leakage are not considered.
Only one LRU failure at a time is considered, i.e., mutually exclusive, though an analysis technique for dependent LRU failures (passive) is developed. All ducting is considered to be one LRU. The failure rates experienced based on the FMEA and Boeing's Dependability Cost (DEPCOST) model are in the same proportion as those predicted. Inputs to the BACS model are obtained through design standards and engineering judgment if not stated explicitly by the Airesearch FMEA or Boeing publications.
Modeling of the Bleed Air Control System (BACS)
Failure mode information is available from the FMEA conducted on the 737-300 BACS including probability assessments for each mode of failure. Mean time between failures for each LRU is available from a completed DEPCOST model based on historical data and maintenance reviews for the system as well. Since an LRU can fail in several Incorporating these prediction metrics into the life cycle costing mechanism DEPCOST model, total diagnosability cost savings can be discovered.
Diagnosability Metrics
For diagnosability to be considered in the design/redesign process, there must be some way to predict how system changes will affect system parameters for comparing competing designs with respect to diagnosability. A methodology based on the prediction technique must be arrived at for use in determining what parts of the system should be changed to improve diagnosability.. A prediction metric based on unjustified removals and time is introduced in this section. given ind j is the common indication. Since maintenance technicians work in the diagnostic direction, this indication failure rate is a necessary starting point.
An LRU will be removed in one of two conditions: failed or not failed. Removal in the failed condition can be predicted directly from the reliability of the LRU and is justified. Removal in the not failed condition, or unjustified removal, is a function of the probability of detecting the wrong LRU and the time it will take to repair it as well as how often the other LRU candidates for that indication fail. Equation (2) For a complete prediction of the total MTBUR of a particular LRU in a system, equation (3) is inverted for each indication to find the unjustified removal rate and then added to the others to find the total unjustified removal rate of the particular LRU. The total unjustified removal rate is then inverted to find the total MTBUR un which is applied to equation (2) . MTBUR predictions are found in the next section.
Application and Evaluation of MTBUR Prediction Metric
The procedures introduced in the previous sections allow the designer to accurately model an existing system to shed light on which LRUs are a source of diagnosability problems. The designer can also incorporate system changes and see precisely how time and cost are affected. For the BACS, the PRSOV is a known diagnostic challenge due to its historical high rate of unjustifiable removals. Previous work (Clark, 1993) 
Application of MTBUR prediction to the original 737 BACS
Only active/independent failures will be analyzed which make up the vast majority of unjustifiable removals (over 90%). From the fault tree analysis model of Figure 4 , the metrics from section 3.0 can be applied for each LRU to arrive at a predicted MTBUR.
Using the DEPCOST model for historical values of each LRUs MTBUR, an evaluation of the prediction metric may be accomplished. 
System Modification and Comparison
All redesigns are based on not only diagnosability improvements, but also on cost savings since cost is always the common denominator. Four design modifications are studied and evaluations for each based on feasibility given. The benchmark for all design comparisons is the original design using predicted values of MTBUR for continuity.
Change 1--Remove Pressure Function from PRSOV
Like the temperature control function, the pressure control function of the PRSOV is shared by other LRUs. In this case, the pressure is regulated directly at the high and low pressure ports instead of at the junction of the two just prior to the precooler. This change requires the check valve to be replaced by a control valve. Also, the Breg must then be moved to the new control valve to monitor downstream pressure and signal a bleed trip off indication in the event of an overpressurization.
Based on benchmark MTBUR and cost, change 1 increases the MTBUR for the PRSOV by 51 percent, decreases the MTBUR for the check valve by 79 percent, and slightly decreases the MTBUR for the Breg. Since the check valve is converted to a control valve, the failure rate of its counterpart control valve, the HPSOV, is assigned to the check valve bringing its MTBUR down exponentially. Since the check valve is more resistant to cost change than the PRSOV due to labor time and ambiguity, overall cost is in favor of the PRSOV. The cost savings for this system change is on the order of 8 percent--a significant amount based on the size and complexity of an aircraft system.
The feasibility of this design change can be approached from two directions. The number of LRUs remains constant, and hence the complexity does not increase nor do the functional requirements change drastically. Even the relationship of the Breg is not significantly altered since it was remotely located from the PRSOV anyway. Yet, considering the limited amount of space available in this particular system, any change in size and complexity at the LRU level could be restrictive, i.e., making the check valve a control valve. Also, keeping the bleed trip off functional relationship with the PRSOV requires an additional control line from the Breg.
For an original design for future aircraft (737-600,700,800...) change 1 is a feasible and logical design to address the unjustifiable removal problem, but a "quick fix"
for current aircraft it is not.
Change 2--Add PRSOV Closed Sensor Light
Using an existing design modification based on the 747-400 BACS design, a PRSOV closed sensor light/indication is added to the system to arrest the unjustifiable removals of at least that particular LRU. Since 70 percent of the PRSOV failure modes are in the closed position, this modification promises significant impact.
Basically, this modification entails simply adding a limit switch type sensor to give the aircraft crew, and thus troubleshooting personnel, an indication when the valve is in its closed position (indication 6 for analysis). Thus, if an indication 2 (bleed pressure low)
occurs without an indication 6 (PRSOV closed) then a PRSOV failure can be discounted.
This decrease in ambiguity of indication 2 (below normal analog pressure gauge reading), which is the most ambiguous, should aid in overall system diagnosability. Since so many system variables comprise fuel saving strategies, the cost benefit seems to be in favor of increased weight based on the amount of savings this change produces. Even in this particular system, there is always enough room under the cowling for "just one more sensor".
Change 3--Add Indication 3 to PRSOV
Targeting the PRSOV once again, the function-indication relationship is modified to decrease the ambiguity of indication 2 in much the same way as adding a sensor. This change would replace two wires running from the switches with one wire running only from the PRSOV to the bleed switch off light. A drawback would be an apparent need to install a limit switch sensor in the PRSOV to monitor its position and relay the message to the indication, therefore adding a sensor like change 2 but not decreasing the ambiguity as much as a separate indication might.
Overall, this design mentality is logical. Scrutiny reveals that complexity is even reduced if the bleed trip off light signal wires are removed from the Breg overpressure and overtemperature switches. Of course, a modification like this may take more hours of overhaul than desired. In addition, even though indication 2 decreases in ambiguity, indication 23 increases in ambiguity. In light of the above discussion, change 3 promises to be a sound design.
Change 4--Add PRSOV & FAMV Stuck Sensors
The final modification of this analysis incorporates a "stuck" sensor for both the PRSOV and FAMV. This modification essentially eliminates all unjustifiable removals of the two least diagnosable/highest cost drivers in the pneumatic system.
Both the PRSOV and FAMV incorporate butterfly-type valves for their operation so a sensor placed on the axis of the valve could monitor any movement, or lack thereof.
Complexity is not increased to a great extent and added weight does not seem to threaten feasibility. Table 2 . Cost analysis of modifications.
Conclusion
The growing life cycle cost dependency of quality products is prompting design engineers to meet product specifications with diagnosability as a major ingredient. This research has addressed diagnosability analysis for mechanical systems quantitatively by means of LRU-indication relationships. These relationships, along with structure which is defined by maintenance time, essentially determine the diagnosability of a system. As system LRU functions and indications are modified, diagnosability also changes based on the reliability of each LRU and the ambiguity of each indication. The MTBUR of each system LRU is a direct measure of diagnosability. A generic metric was developed to predict LRU MTBURs for any system made up of several LRUs that give some indication of failure. The MTBUR of a particular LRU is directly related to the probability of detecting that particular LRU and its time to repair given a failure indication including other LRUs. The value of MTBUR for each LRU can be compared to that of other LRUs to determine which ones present a diagnostic challenge. System changes based on this information can then be made to decrease the cost of diagnosability.
The MTBUR prediction metric was applied to the 737 BACS to determine system improvements. LRU evaluation presented the PRSOV and FAMV as primary candidates for diagnosability improvement. The life cycle costing mechanism, DEPCOST model, was used to evaluate system cost based on the diagnosability parameters of unjustified removals, spares cost, and maintenance time. Four design changes were suggested and analyzed based on MTBUR, cost, and feasibility. These redesigns modify LRU indications by optimizing current indications or by adding sensors to strategic LRUs.
Evaluations of the redesigns revealed an improvement in diagnosability directly impacting the cost of the system.
Quality through diagnosability cannot be neglected in today's marketplace. The MTBUR prediction serves as an indespensible design tool for analysis of system redesigns, sensor reallocations, and the developement of system fault isolation procedures.
The relationships of diagnosability developed here can be directly compared with other common design decision-making variables such as manufacturability and ease of assembly in the arena of life cycle costing. The optimal result of lower life cycle costs increases throughout the design process since the prediction model becomes more accurate as the system is refined. The direction of future research is expected to address the structure of designs explicitly in terms of maintenance hours. This will especially enhance prediction techniques of systems with a lack of historical data.
